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ABSTRACT 
 
Against the backdrop of corporate tax policy changes in India, the paper attempts to measure the 
incidence of corporate income tax in India under a general equilibrium setting. Using seemingly 
uncorrelated regression coefficients and dynamic panel estimates, we tried to analyze both the 
relative burden of corporate tax borne by capital and labor and the efficiency effects of 
corporate income tax. The data for the study is compiled from corporate firms listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) for the period 
2000–15. Our empirical estimates suggest that in India capital bears more of the burden of 
corporate taxes than labor. However, the results vary with different proxies of capital used in the 
models. Though it is contrary to the Harberger (1962) hypothesis that the burden of corporate 
tax is shifted to labor rather than capital, it confirms the existing empirical results in the context 
of India.  
 
KEYWORDS: Corporate Tax; Tax Incidence; Capital; Labor 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS: C33; H22; H25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Theoretically, higher corporate taxes lead to lower capital formation, hence lower labor 
productivity and lower wages. In an open economy where capital flows across borders, the 
corporate tax has an impact on capital investments made by firms. Capital moves from high-tax 
to low-tax countries and higher capital formation in low-tax countries leads to higher capital-
labor ratios, higher labor productivity, and hence higher wages. The burden in the high-tax 
country falls on both capital and labor, though in different proportions. Harberger (1962) asserts 
labor bears most of the burden of corporate taxes in an open economy. A recent study by Fuest, 
Peichl, and Siegloch (2017) found that more than half of the corporate tax burden is passed onto 
workers in Germany, implying a reduced overall progressivity of their tax system.  
 
The paper is an attempt to test this theory using empirics in the context of India. An important 
question that remains largely unanswered in the Indian context is the incidence of corporate tax. 
Though corporate taxes are imposed on firms, a valid question is which factor of production 
actually bears the economic burden of such a tax. Various studies have attempted to test whether 
the burden falls on the owners of capital or on the labor employed by the firms. We test the 
essential question of whether or not corporate taxation has a clear empirical impact on the labor 
market.  
 
The paper uses data from 5,666 corporate firms in India (listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
[BSE] and the National Stock Exchange of India [NSE]) from 2000–15 and analyzes the impact 
of corporate tax on the capital and labor employed by corporations. The framework used in this 
paper has been heavily derived from Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) with several modifications. 
The framework used allows us to find the overall burden of the tax shared between labor and 
capital. In this general equilibrium framework, both relative burdens and the efficiency effects 
of corporate taxation have been deduced. Evidently, there is no direct effect of corporate tax on 
wages; most of the burden of corporate taxes falls on capital. This is in contrast to other studies 
being conducted in different countries.  
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Clausing (2013) explains why such findings may result. Clausing’s paper explains that this 
could simply be that aggregate data are too coarse to pick up the true causal mechanisms at 
work, given the myriad factors that influence labor market outcomes. Second, it is possible that 
capital or shareholders bear the lion’s share of the corporate tax burden, and prior studies have 
picked up spurious relationships due to methodological or data constraints. In this paper, we 
looked into these issues and improved on the methodology.  
 
The paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 reviews the current theoretical and empirical 
literature on corporate tax incidence. Section 3 explains the analytical framework used in 
estimating the equations. Section 4 describes the data used and the relation between the 
variables used. Section 5 provides for and interprets the results from econometric modeling. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The analysis in Harberger (1962) concluded that corporate tax has a larger impact on capital in 
the corporate sector. The imposition of a corporate tax discourages the use of capital, also 
reducing the return on capital for the entire economy. His analysis assumes a closed economy 
with fixed labor and capital levels for a country as a whole. However, a consideration of the 
open economy reverses the results wherein the burden of a corporate tax is borne by labor. The 
corporate capital moves from high-tax countries to low-tax ones, reducing the capital-labor ratio 
in the former and leading to a lower marginal product of labor and lower wages. At the same 
time, low-tax countries experience higher capital-labor ratios, a higher marginal product of 
labor, and hence higher wages. Randolph (2006) conducts his study on the basis of Harberger’s 
model. Assuming an open economy, he asserts that domestic owners shift much of the burden of 
the corporate tax onto capital owners abroad. He concludes that in the US, labor would bear 70 
percent of the burden of the tax and capital would bear 30 percent of the burden. 
 
Using data from 65 countries over 25 years, Hassett and Mathur (2006) focus on the long-term 
impact of higher corporate taxes on wages. The paper concludes that higher taxes depress 
wages. Moreover the findings suggest that not only domestic but international tax rates also 
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affect domestic wages. This significant relation between corporate taxes and wages is tested 
using the fixed effects technique. Felix (2007) tests the relationship between taxes and the 
burden on capital and labor. Using data for 19 countries from 1979–2002, the paper finds that a 
1 percent higher corporate tax leads to 0.7 percent lower wages after controlling for observable 
worker characteristics. The paper concludes that as the capital tax rate increases, the burden falls 
both on labor and capital, with labor bearing slightly more than half of this burden.  
Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini (2007) use company-level European data to estimate the 
wage effects of tax burdens that differ between firms. The results show that firms with greater 
tax obligations pay lower wages. Also the estimates imply that labor bears close to 100 percent 
of the corporate tax burden in the long run. 
 
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) estimate wage and interest rate sensitivity to corporate tax rates 
for a four-year sample of US multinational firm affiliates in OECD countries in the years 1989, 
1994, 1999, and 2004. Finding the relative burden of the corporate tax, they constrain the total 
burden shares to one using the seemingly unrelated regression technique. They find that labor 
bears between 45 percent and 75 percent of the total burden. Clausing (2012) compares OECD 
countries to find the effect of corporate taxes on wages. Contrary to the previous empirical 
literature, the paper finds no evidence of linkages between corporate taxes and wages. A 
thorough review of the theoretical literature, showing a probable link between the two, is in 
contrast with the empirics of the paper, which reveals no links between corporate taxes and 
wages. Carroll (2009) uses cross-sectional state-level data from 1970–2007 to investigate the 
relationship between corporate taxes and wages at the state level while controlling for both state 
and time effects. The paper finds a significant relationship between the two and concludes that a 
1 percent increase in the average state and local corporate tax rate can lower real wages by 
0.014 percent. One of the few papers in the Indian context is by Shome (1978), which explores 
the effect of a marginal change in the corporate tax on wages in the economy. In a general 
equilibrium setting, the incidence of corporate tax is tested for the period 1971–72. The findings 
suggest that a part of the burden of corporate taxes are shifted to laborers and that there is a need 
to alter the tax base, as the purpose of the corporate tax is in fact to tax capital income and not 
labor. We use Desai, Foley, and Hines’s (2007) framework to estimate the corporate tax 
incidence in India. 
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3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Drawing from the analytical framework used in Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007), our paper 
makes several modifications. This general equilibrium framework is the basis of the regressions 
run to analyze the impact of the corporate tax on capital and labor. 
Consider a firm that produces output using capital (K) and labor (L) as inputs, assuming a 
production function Q (K, L) with the output price being normalized to unity. The capital 
investments of the firm are assumed not to depreciate, and are financed with a combination of 
debt (B) and equity (E). Labor is paid a wage of w, and debt holders receive a return of r. 
Denoting by ρ the firm’s after-corporate-tax rate of return to equity investments, and denoting 
the corporate tax rate by c, it follows that: 
 
 ρE =  [Q(K, L) − wL − rB] (1 − c)                                                        (1) 
 
Differentiating this expression with respect to c gives, 
 
 dρ
dc
E +
dw
dc
L(1 − c) + 
dr
dc
B(1 − c) = −[Q(K, L) − wL − rB]             (2)                                                
 
The left side of equation (2) consists of three terms, of which the first is the change in returns to 
equity holders, the second is the change in after-tax labor cost, and the third is the change in 
after-tax borrowing costs. The right side of equation (2) is simply the effect of a tax change on 
after-tax profits. Hence equation (2) reflects that higher tax costs must be compensated for by a 
reduction in wages or capital returns, or, equivalently, that some factor in the economy must 
bear the burden of corporate taxes. 
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The output prices are normalized to one in the derivation of equation (2), which implies that 
output prices are assumed not to change as the corporate tax rates change. This is explained in 
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007):  
 
 
 
In a single-sector closed economy this assumption would simply represent a 
normalization of units, having no economic consequence, but in a multisector 
economy, or an open economy, the assumption that output prices are unaffected 
by corporate tax rates rules out effects that arise from inter-sectoral reallocation 
of resources (as in Harberger [1962]) or changing terms of trade between 
countries. For a small open economy in which the corporate and non-corporate 
sectors produce goods for a competitive world market, it follows (Gordon and 
Hines 2002) that output prices cannot change in response to corporate tax 
changes, making the fixed price assumption a reasonable specification in this 
situation. 
 
Suppose that capital investments are financed with a fraction α of debt and (1-α) of equity. 
Then,  
 
  ρ(1 − α)K = [Q(K, L) − wL − rαK](1 − c)             (3)                                                                          
 
and differentiating with respect to c results in: 
 
dρ
dc
(1 − α)K +
dw
dc
L(1 − c) + 
dr
dc
αK(1 − c) = −[Q(K, L) − wL − rαK]      (4)                                                               
 
The paper by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) assumes that ρ=r and α=0, which means that the 
firms are entirely financed by equity. Our paper does away with these rather strong assumptions 
and works out the model under a more realistic set of assumptions. Hence the framework differs 
from the original paper from here onwards; however the results are eventually identical. 
 
From equation (3), [Q(K,L)-wL-rαK] can be substituted for ρ(1-α)K/(1-c). Hence, 
 
dρ
dc
(1 − α)K +
dw
dc
L(1 − c) + 
dr
dc
αK(1 − c) =
−ρ(1−α)K 
1−c
    (5) 
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dρ
dc
(1 − α)K + 
dr
dc
αK(1 − c) +
dw
dc
L(1 − c) =
−ρ(1−α)K 
1−c
                                                                      
 
1−c
ρ
dρ 
dc 
 
ρ(1−α)K
ρ(1−α)K
+ 
1
r
dr
dc
rαK(1−c)2
ρ(1−α)K
+
1
w
dw
dc
wL(1−c)2
ρ(1−α)K
= −1              (6)                         
               
                                                     
Applying  
𝑑𝜌 
𝑑𝑐 
= −
𝑑𝜌 
𝑑(1−𝑐) 
,
𝑑𝑟
𝑑𝑐
= −
𝑑𝑟
𝑑(1−𝑐)
 and 
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑐
= −
𝑑𝑤
𝑑(1−𝑐)
 , we obtain the following: 
 
1−c
ρ
dρ 
d(1−c) 
 + 
1−c
r
dr
d(1−c)
[
rαK(1−c)
ρ(1−α)K
] +
1−c
w
dw
d(1−c)
[
wL(1−c)
ρ(1−α)K
] = 1                  (7)                                                                                                               
 
Now defining the labor share of output as s= wL/Q (as in Desai, Foley, and Hines [2007]) and 
d=rαK/Q, where αK is the debt of the firm and hence rαK is the interest expenses of the firm. 
(This d however is negligible in the case of Indian corporate firms and assumed to be zero in 
this model)2 
 
To shorten the equation we use  
𝑤𝐿(1−𝑐)
𝜌(1−𝛼)𝐾
=
𝑤𝐿
𝑄−𝑤𝐿−𝑟𝛼𝐾 
=
𝑤𝐿/𝑄
(𝑄−𝑤𝐿−𝑟𝛼𝐾)/𝑄
=
𝑠
1−𝑠−𝑟𝛼𝐾/𝑄
=
𝑠
1−𝑠−𝑑
  
 
Also 
𝑟𝛼𝐾(1−𝑐)
𝜌(1−𝛼)𝐾
=
𝑟𝛼𝐾
𝑄−𝑤𝐿−𝑟𝛼𝐾
=
𝑟𝛼𝐾/𝑄
(𝑄−𝑤𝐿−𝑟𝛼𝐾)/𝑄
=
𝑑
1−𝑠−𝑑
 
 
Equation (7) now becomes  
 
1−𝑐
𝜌
𝑑𝜌 
𝑑(1−𝑐) 
 +  
1−𝑐
𝑟
𝑑𝑟
𝑑(1−𝑐)
[
𝑑
1−𝑠−𝑑
] +
1−𝑐
𝑤
𝑑𝑤
𝑑(1−𝑐)
[
𝑠
1−𝑠−𝑑
] = 1                (8) 
                                                      
The assumption that d is nearly equal to one for most Indian firms is made, as supported by 
data. Hence, equation (8) reduces to:  
 
                                                          
2 d was calculated using data from the mentioned sources in this paper. For the year 2015, the value of d was 0 for 
1,093 firms; in the range of 0.00005 for 24 firms; 0.0001 to 0.0009 for 165 firms; 0.001 to 0.009 for 539 firms; 0.01 
to 0.09 for 1,597 firms; 0.1–0.9 for 582 firms; and larger than 1 for 80 firms. The data for the remaining firms is 
missing. Hence we assume d to be negligible. 
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1−𝑐
𝜌
𝑑𝜌 
𝑑(1−𝑐) 
 +
1−𝑐
𝑤
𝑑𝑤
𝑑(1−𝑐)
[
𝑠
1−𝑠
] = 1                     (9)                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
To estimate a framework in which we assess the impact of corporate taxes on wages and capital, 
we form the equations given below. Here s* is defined as
1−𝑠
𝑠
.  Thus, 
 
ln𝑤 = 𝛽𝑋 + 𝛾𝑠∗ ln(1 − 𝑐) + 𝜀            (10)                                                                                                          
In the above equation,  𝛾 =
𝑑𝑤
𝑑(1−𝑐)
1−𝑐
𝑤
𝑠
1−𝑠
. This very clearly is the second half of the left-hand 
side of equation (9). Also, as Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) mention, equation (10) requires 
that s* should not be a function of c. A parallel relationship for capital is drawn: 
 
ln 𝜌 = 𝛽′ 𝑋 + 𝛾′ ln(1 − 𝑐) + 𝜀′             (11)                                                                                                 
 
for which  𝛾′ =
𝑑𝜌 
𝑑(1−𝑐) 
1−𝑐
𝜌
 
 
The relationship expressed in equation (9) carries implications for the estimated relationships 
(10) and (11). These two equations are not independent but must satisfy an adding-up constraint. 
The constraint being:  𝛾 +𝛾′ = 1.  
                                                               
This cross-equation restriction is used to jointly estimate equations (10) and (11). As Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2007) mention, the coefficients derived from estimating these equations 
without imposing the cross-equation constraint do not have natural interpretations, as they 
would then capture efficiency effects of corporate taxation and the influence of correlated 
omitted variables, instead of the determinants of relative burdens (Desai, Foley, and Hines 
2007). However, in our paper both the relative burdens and the efficiency effects of the 
corporate tax are calculated using different techniques. 
 
The coefficients 𝛾 and 𝛾′ serve to identify the relative tax burdens on the two factors of 
production. We know that: 
 
ρ(1-α)K=[Q(K,L)-wL-rαK](1-c)           
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hence: 
 
Q-wL= 
𝜌(1−𝛼)𝐾
1−𝑐
+  𝑟𝐾.  
 
 
Also,  
 
s=wL/Q 
 
hence:  
 
𝑠
1
𝑤
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑙𝑛(1−𝑐)
=
𝑤𝐿 
𝑄
1
𝑤
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑙𝑛(1−𝑐)
=
𝐿 
𝑄
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑙𝑛(1−𝑐)
  
 
and  
 
1-s= 
𝑄−𝑤𝐿
𝑄
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (1 − 𝑠)
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
1
𝜌
=
𝑄−𝑤𝐿
𝑄
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
1
𝜌
= (
𝜌(1−𝛼)𝐾
(1−𝑐)𝑄
+ 
𝑟𝐾
𝑄
)
1
𝜌
 
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
                 
 
As d=rK/Q=0, we finally arrive at: 
 
(1 − 𝑠)
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
1
𝜌
 =  
𝜌(1−𝛼)𝐾
(1−𝑐)𝑄
 
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
                                      
 
Now 
𝛾
𝛾′
=
 
𝑠
1−𝑠 
1
𝑤
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑙𝑛(1−𝑐)
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln (1−𝑐)
1
𝜌
 =
𝐿 
𝑄
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑙𝑛(1−𝑐)
(1−𝛼)𝐾
(1−𝑐)𝑄
 
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
=
𝐿
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑙𝑛(1−𝑐)
 𝐾(1−𝛼)
(1−𝑐)
 
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
=
𝐿 [
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑙𝑛(1−𝑐)
]
𝐾 [
1−𝛼
1−𝑐
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
]
. 
 
From the above equation, the effect of a tax change on returns to labor is given by 
𝐿 [
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑙𝑛(1−𝑐)
], and the effect of a tax change on returns to capital is given by 𝐾 [
1−𝛼
1−𝑐
𝑑𝜌
𝑑 ln(1−𝑐)
] 
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Hence the above equations show the ratio of the burdens borne by labor and capital, 
respectively, to a small tax change. This ratio equals the ratio of the two estimated coefficients 𝛾 
and 𝛾′. 
 
Thus, constraining the resulting estimates to sum to one, the equations provide direct estimates 
of the relative shares of the corporate tax burden borne by labor and by capital. The coefficients 
thus give the relative burdens borne by the factors of production rather than total burdens. 
 
4. INTERPRETING DATA 
 
Our data covers the period 2000–15 and includes 5,666 Indian corporate (BSE and NSE listed) 
firms. The main source of the data is the Prowess IQ database provided by the Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), one of the most reliable sources for data on Indian 
corporate firms. In the general equilibrium framework, capital is the dependent variable in the 
first equation and labor is the dependent variable in the second equation. The most important 
independent variable is the effective corporate tax of the firms. The natural log of all variables 
has been used in the regression models. Three proxies are used for the capital variable, namely 
return on equity (ROE), return on debt (ROD), and gross fixed assets (GFA). ROD is the 
interest rate paid to the debt holders by the firm and is calculated by dividing interest paid by the 
sum of the long-term and short-term borrowing of the firms, with all figures in millions (data for 
long-term and short-term borrowing was available only from 2011–15, therefore the analysis for 
this indicator is restricted). ROE is the rate of return received by the shareholders from the 
profits of the firm after taxes have been paid. It is computed as the ratio of profit after tax to the 
average net worth, with both values in millions. The GFA of the firm were directly available 
and are measured in millions. The variable used for calculating the impact of the corporate tax 
on labor is the wages paid to the laborers by the firms. “Compensation to employees” is used as 
a proxy for wages in this paper. 
 
The effective corporate tax to which the firms are subjected is the measure “corporate tax/profit 
before tax,” available directly from the database; labor share in total output (s) is calculated by 
dividing the compensation to employees by the total income of the firms (wL/Q). For the 
calculation of total factor productivity (TFP), the proxy for revenue is the “total income” of the 
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firms, the power variable is the “power, fuel, and water charges” incurred by the firms, and the 
raw materials variable is the “raw material costs” to the firms. Moreover, we use all supply-side 
variables that affect a corporate firm rather than demand-side variables. For example, we do not 
include education as an explanatory variable in our analysis, though it is known to have a 
significant impact on the wages of labor. We wanted to analyze the influence of firm-specific 
variables on the corporate firms’ behavior. 
 
 
4.1  Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
Researchers have tried to test the positive correlation between input levels and the unobserved 
firm-specific productivity shocks in the estimation of a production function. Profit-maximizing 
firms respond to positive productivity shocks by expanding output, which requires additional 
inputs. Negative shocks lead firms to decrease output, which results in decreasing input usage. 
Moreover, TFP helps in evaluating the implications of the policy measures undertaken on the 
performance of the firm. In order to estimate productivity, ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed 
effects, or the recent semi-parametric method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) can be used. In the 
case of OLS, though it is difficult to obtain reliable measures, productivity can be measured as 
the residual of a production function.  
 
Consider a Cobb–Douglas production function: 
 
Yit = AitKit
βk
Lit
βl 
Mit
βm
                      (12)                                                                                                       
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the physical output of firm i in period t; Kit, Lit, and Mit are inputs of capital, labor, 
and materials, respectively; and Ait is the Hicksian neutral efficiency level of firm i in period t. 
Taking natural logs of equation (1) results in a linear production function, 
 
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + βmmit + εit  
 
where lower-case letters refer to natural logarithms and 
 
12 
 
ln (Ait ) = β0 + εit 
 
where β0 measures the mean efficiency level across firms and over time; and εit is the time- and 
producer-specific deviation from that mean, which can then be further decomposed into an 
observable and unobservable component. This results in the following equation: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑞
            (13)                                                                        
       
where ω𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  represents the firm-level productivity and 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑞
 is the independent and 
identically distributed component representing unexpected deviations from the mean due to 
measurement error, unexpected delays, or other external circumstances. Estimating equation (2), 
we solve for ωit. Estimated productivity can then be calculated as follows: 
 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 ⏞ = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ⏞ + 𝛽0 ⏞= 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘⏞𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙⏞ 𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑚⏞ 𝑚𝑖𝑡 
 
Equation (2) can be estimated using OLS. However, under this method inputs of the firm in the 
production function should be exogenous or be independent of the efficiency level of the firm. 
Marschak and Andrews (1944) mention that inputs in the production function are not 
independently chosen, but rather determined by the characteristics of the firm, including its 
efficiency. This “endogeneity of inputs,” or simultaneity bias, is defined as the correlation 
between the level of inputs chosen and unobserved productivity shocks (De Loecker 2007). 
Intuitively, simultaneity arises from the fact that the choice of inputs is not under the control of 
the econometrician, but determined by the individual firms’ choices (Griliches and Mairesse 
1995). If the firm has prior knowledge of ωit at the time input decisions are made, endogeneity 
arises because input quantities will be (partly) determined by prior beliefs about labor 
productivity (Olley and Pakes 1996). Specifically, a positive productivity shock will likely lead 
to increased variable input usage leading to an upward bias in the input coefficients for labor 
and materials (De Loecker 2007). In the presence of many inputs and simultaneity issues, it is 
generally impossible to determine the direction of the bias in the capital coefficient. Hence, an 
OLS estimation that assumes no correlation between input demands and the unobserved 
productivity term will give inconsistent estimates of the input coefficients. However, the fact 
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holds that firm productivity can be both contemporaneously and serially correlated with inputs. 
To this endogeneity problem, there exists a standard solution, which is to compute a fixed 
effects, or “within,” estimator that uses deviations from firm-specific means in OLS estimation. 
This checks the simultaneity problem (as in OLS) provided the firm’s productivity is time 
invariant. By assuming that ωit (equation [2]) is plant specific, but time invariant, it is possible 
to estimate the equation using a fixed effects estimator (Pavcnik 2000; Levinsohn and Petrin 
2003). The estimating equation is as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑞
 
 
Equation (2) can be estimated in levels using a least-square dummy variable estimator (i.e., 
including firm-specific effects) or in first (or mean) differences. Provided unobserved 
productivity (ωit) does not vary over time, estimation of the above equation will result in 
consistent coefficients for labor, capital, and materials. The fixed effects estimator overcomes 
the simultaneity bias that OLS can’t correct for. Also given that exit decisions are determined by 
the time-invariant, firm-specific effects ωi, the fixed effects estimator also eliminates the 
selection bias caused by endogenous exit in the sample.  
 
In spite of these benefits, this approach has various drawbacks. Productivity is unlikely to 
remain constant over long periods of time, especially during periods of significant policy and 
structural changes. The constant flux in firm decisions regarding input use and firm entry and 
exit suggest a more general stochastic process for the unobserved productivity term than that 
specified by fixed effects. Hence, the fixed effects estimator will at best remove the effects of 
the time-invariant component of the productivity variable, but will still lead to inconsistent 
estimates. Also, Olley and Pakes (1996) constructed a fixed effects model on the balanced and 
unbalanced sample and found large differences between the two sets of coefficients, suggesting 
the assumptions underlying the model are invalid. Finally, the fixed effects estimator imposes 
restrictions on the exogeneity of the inputs, conditional on firm heterogeneity. In economic 
terms this means that inputs cannot be chosen in reaction to productivity shocks, an assumption 
that is not likely to hold in practice (Wooldridge 2009). Further work in this field comes from 
Olley and Pakes (1996) who developed an estimator that uses investment as a proxy for these 
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unobservable shocks. However, an improvement over the Olley–Pakes method is that of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), where instead of investment, intermediate inputs are used as a 
proxy. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) illustrate that for a two-input production function where 
labor is the only freely variable input and capital is quasi-fixed, the capital coefficient will be 
biased downward if a positive correlation exists between labor and capital. Citing reasons for 
using intermediate inputs over investment (as used by Olley and Pakes), Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) suggest that firm-level datasets indicate investment is very lumpy (that is, there are 
substantial adjustment costs). If this is true, the investment proxy may not respond smoothly to 
the productivity shock, violating the consistency condition. Also, the investment proxy is only 
valid for plants reporting nonzero investment. 
 
Another benefit is that if it is less costly to adjust the intermediate input, it may respond more 
fully to the entire productivity term than it does to the investment term. Also an intermediate 
input provides a simple link between the estimation strategy and the economic theory, primarily 
because intermediate inputs are not typically state variables. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
develop this link, showing the conditions that must hold if intermediate inputs are to be a valid 
proxy for the productivity shock. In addition, they derive the expected directions of bias on the 
OLS estimates relative to Levinsohn and Petrin’s intermediate input approach when 
simultaneity exists. Using data from Chilean manufacturing industries, Levinshon and Petrin 
prove that significant differences exist between OLS and their approach that are exactly 
consistent with simultaneity. 
 
The Levinsohn–Petrin approach assumes a Cobb–Douglas production function and it follows as: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 + Ƞ𝑡 
 
where yt is the logarithm of the firm’s output, most often measured as gross revenue or value 
added; lt and mt are the logarithm of the freely variable inputs labor and the intermediate input; 
and kt is the logarithm of the state variable capital. 
 
The error term has two components: the transmitted productivity component (given as ωt) and Ƞt 
(an error term that is uncorrelated with input choices). The key difference between ωt  and Ƞt is 
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that the former is a state variable and, hence it impacts the firm’s decision rules. It is not 
observed by the econometrician, and it can impact the choices of inputs, leading to the well-
known simultaneity problem in production function estimation. Estimators ignoring the 
correlation between inputs and this unobservable factor (like OLS) will yield inconsistent 
results. 
 
 
Demand for the intermediate input mt is assumed to depend on the firm’s state variables kt and 
ωt: 
 
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡(𝑘𝑡, 𝜔𝑡) 
 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show that the demand function is monotonically increasing in ωt , 
making assumptions about the firm’s production technology. This allows inversion of the 
intermediate demand function, so ωt can be written as a function of kt and mt, 
 
𝜔𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡(𝑘𝑡, 𝑚𝑡) 
 
The unobservable productivity term is now expressed solely as a function of two observed 
inputs. 
 
A final identification restriction follows Olley and Pakes (1996). Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
assume that productivity is governed by a first-order Markov process, 
 
𝜔𝑡 = 𝐸[𝜔𝑡І𝜔𝑡−1] + 𝜉𝑡 
 
where 𝜉𝑡 is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with kt, but not necessarily with lt, 
which is part of the source of the simultaneity problem. Productivity in this method is calculated 
in two stages. In the gross revenue case (yt is the gross revenue), let:   
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 + Ƞ𝑡 
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑡 + 𝜑(𝑘𝑡, 𝑚𝑡) + Ƞ𝑡 
 
where  
 
𝜑(𝑘𝑡, 𝑚𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡(𝑘𝑡, 𝑚𝑡) 
 
Substituting a third-order polynomial approximation in 𝑘𝑡 and 𝑚𝑡 in place of 𝜑(𝑘𝑡, 𝑚𝑡) makes 
it possible to consistently estimate parameters of the revenue equation using OLS as: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑡 +∑∑𝛿𝑖𝑗 
3−𝑖
𝑗=0
3
𝑖=0
𝑘𝑡
𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑗 + Ƞ𝑡 
 
where β0 is not separately identified from the intercept of φ(kt, mt). This completes the first 
stage of the estimation routine from Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), from which an estimate of βl 
and an estimate of 𝜑𝑡are available.  
 
The second stage of the procedure identifies the coefficient βk. It begins by computing the 
estimated value for 𝜑𝑡 using  𝜑𝑡⏞ = 𝑦𝑡 ⏞- 𝛽𝑙⏞ 𝑙𝑡 
 
𝜑𝑡⏞ = 𝛿0 ⏞ +∑∑𝛿𝑖𝑗 ⏞
3−𝑖
𝑗=0
3
𝑖=0
𝑘𝑡
𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑗 − 𝛽𝑙⏞ 𝑙𝑡 
 
For any candidate values βk
∗  and βm
∗   (for βk and βm), we estimate 𝜔𝑡⏞ using 𝜔𝑡⏞ = 𝜑𝑡⏞−βk
∗ 𝑘𝑡 −
βm
∗ 𝑚𝑡. 
 
Using these values, a consistent (nonparametric) approximation to E[ωt|ωt−1] is given by the 
predicted values from the regression: 
 
𝜔𝑡⏞ = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝜔𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝜔𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾3𝜔𝑡−1
3 + 𝜖𝑡 
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which Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) call 𝐸[𝜔𝑡І𝜔𝑡−1]. 
 
Then the residual for (βk
∗ , βm
∗ ) is computed as:  
 
 
 
Ƞt + ξt̂ = yt − βl⏞ lt − βk
∗ kt − βm
∗ mt −  E[ωt|ωt−1]̂  
 
E[Ƞt + ξtІmt−1]=0 
 
Thus with 𝑍𝑡= (𝑘𝑡, 𝑚𝑡−1),     
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛(βk
∗ βm
∗ )∑{∑(Ƞ𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡  ⏞    
𝑡
) 𝑍ℎ𝑡}
2
ℎ
 
 
Here one redefines 𝑍𝑡=  (𝑘𝑡 , 𝑚𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑡−1, 𝑘𝑡−1,𝑚𝑡−2). 𝛽𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑚 are then defined as the solution 
to: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛(βk
∗ βm
∗ )∑{∑(Ƞ𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡  ⏞    
𝑡
) 𝑍ℎ𝑡}
2
ℎ
 
 
The variables used for the calculation are log of total income (used to represent gross revenue), 
log of GFA, log of ROE for capital, log of compensation to the employees for labor, and log of 
expenses on power and fuel for the inputs.  
 
We now compare the results from the OLS and Levinsohn–Petrin methods. According to 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), in case of the parameters for freely variable inputs (power and 
labor) the OLS estimates should be greater than the Levinsohn–Petrin estimates. However, 
regarding the GFA variable, it doesn’t hold in the case of power but holds in the case of ROE 
well. We also find the labor coefficient from the OLS regression to be biased upwards due to the 
endogeneity of input choices, since OLS does not control for firm-specific differences in 
productivity, which has been corrected in the Levinsohn–Petrin method. 
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The bias of the capital coefficient depends on the degree of correlation among the inputs and the 
productivity shocks. In this particular application, the OLS estimate is less than the Levinsohn–
Petrin estimate. The capital coefficient in OLS is biased downwards. If capital responds to the 
transmitted productivity shock, its coefficient would be biased upwards. However, if capital is 
not correlated with this period’s transmitted shock (but variable inputs are), or capital is more 
strongly correlated with the productivity shock than the variable inputs are, the OLS estimate on 
capital is likely to be biased downward.  
 
Table 1: GFA and Wages Model 
Parameters Model 
 OLS FE LP 
log(power) 0.2051 
(0.0035) 
0.2531   
(0.0048) 
0.4303   
(0.0461) 
log(GFA) 0.1658   
(0.0045) 
0.0593  
(0.0052)   
0.2238   
(0.0428) 
log(wage) 0.6004   
(0.004) 
0.6219 
(0.0056) 
0.5859   
(0.0129) 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
Table 2: ROE and Wages Model 
Parameters Model 
 OLS FE LP 
log(power) 0.2438   
(0.0034) 
0.2517 
(0.0047) 
0.1987   
(0.1284)  
log(ROE) 0.0239   
(0.0039) 
0.0603   
(0.0024) 
0.0944   
(0.0169) 
log(wage) 0.6657 
(0.004) 
0.6486 
(0.0051) 
0.6575   
(0.0123) 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
Table 3: ROD and Wages Model 
Parameters Model 
 OLS FE LP 
log(power) 0.232 
(0.0059) 
0.2323 
(0.0098) 
0.7444 
(0.2185) 
log(ROD) 0.0443 
(0.0057) 
0.0307 
(0.0051) 
0.0416 
(0.0225) 
log(wage) 0.6588 
(0.0074) 
0.6029 
(0.013) 
0.6561 
(0.014) 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) pointed out a reason for this is that if capital positively covariates 
with labor but is uncorrelated with the productivity shock, or if this correlation is much weaker 
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than that between the variable inputs and productivity, then the OLS estimate on capital is likely 
to be biased downwards. The fixed effects estimates differ quite substantially from both the 
OLS and Levinsohn–Petrin estimates (tables 1–3). One explanation is that the magnitude of 
each firm’s productivity shock varies over time and is not a constant fixed effect.  
 
 
4.2  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
The descriptive statistics of the variables under consideration are given in table 4. The 
correlation coefficient between wage (log of wage) and the corporate tax, going by the general 
equilibrium framework (s*log(1-c)), is positive and significant, as expected (table 5). The value 
of the correlation coefficient stands at 0.0558. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
log(wage) 2.68 2.73 
log(ROE)  -2.54 1.60 
log(GFA) 4.98 2.76 
log(1- tax rate) -0.11 0.21 
((1-s)/s)LN(1-tax rate) -7.94 72.63 
log(revenue) 5.18 3.13 
log(raw materials) 5.47 2.57 
 
log(power) 2.39 2.64 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix  
 
Ln 
(ROE) 
Ln 
(GFA) 
Ln (wage) 
Ln 
(1-c) 
s*ln(1-c) 
Ln 
(revenue) 
Ln 
(power) 
Ln  
(raw 
material) 
Ln(ROE)   1.0000        
Ln(GFA) 0.3150 
(0.0000) 
1.0000       
Ln (wage)  0.3303 
(0.0000) 
0.8361 
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
Ln (1-c) 0.0939 
(0.0000) 
-0.0807 
(0.0000) 
-0.1610  
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
s* ln(1-c) 0.0412 
(0.0000) 
  0.0411 
(0.0000) 
0.0558  
(0.0000)   
0.1486 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Ln (revenue) 0.3366 
(0.0000) 
0.8122 
(0.0000) 
0.8928 
(0.0000) 
-0.1860 
(0.0000) 
-0.0608 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Ln (power)    0.2325 
(0.0000) 
0.8308 
(0.0000) 
0.7922 
(0.0000) 
-0.0682 
(0.0000) 
0.0342 
(0.0000) 
0.8004 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
Ln (raw 
material)  
0.1439 
(0.0000) 
0.7131 
(0.0000) 
0.7475 
(0.0000) 
-0.1724 
(0.0000) 
-0.0852 
(0.0000) 
0.8753 
(0.0000) 
0.7433 
(0.0000) 
1.000 
Note: “Ln” refers to log. 
Source: Author’s computations 
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Similarly the correlation coefficient between ROE (ln ROE) and the corporate tax going by the 
general equilibrium framework (ln(1-c)) is 0.0939, which is highly positive and significant, as 
expected. However the correlation coefficient between GFA (Ln(GFA)) and ln (1-c) is negative, 
which is perverse to our expectations. There is no possible explanation for such a finding. One 
can only guess if corporate taxes affect the lagged values (t-1 period) of fixed assets rather than 
the current fixed assets (t period). 
 
4.3 Stylized Facts 
Prima facie, the relationship between capital and labor with corporate tax should be negative. 
With the imposition of the corporate tax, the firms may shift their capital to low-tax countries, 
leading to a lower capital-to-labor ratio, which further affects the marginal product of labor and 
hence lower wages. Thus with an increase in the corporate tax, the burden on capital and labor 
increases, leading to lower amounts of capital and labor being employed by firms. However, in 
the general equilibrium framework we use here, the independent variables used are log forms of 
one minus corporate tax. Hence, the expected signs of the coefficients should be positive. We 
test for this in section five. All three proxies for capital (ROE, ROD, and GFA) and wages (the 
proxy for labor) should thus have a positive coefficient. Higher power and fuel charges must 
lead to more labor and capital being employed by the firm in order to produce efficiently. 
Similarly, higher raw material costs will simultaneously lead to more investment in capital and 
labor by the firms. 
 
An increase in the TFP should also lead to lower usage of capital and labor by the firms. In the 
neoclassical model of growth, wherein production requires two main components—inputs (X), 
such as labor and capital, and knowledge (A), considering that knowledge has a direct effect on 
TFP—the more the firm has of A and X, the more output it can produce. Continuing in the 
neoclassical tradition, in the transition from one equilibrium to another, growth may stem from a 
change in both A and X. However, at some (marginal) point it no longer pays off to increase X 
and, in the long run, output growth depends entirely on knowledge creation or technological 
progress. Hence higher TFP is expected to decrease the capital and labor used by the firms.  
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5. ECONOMETRIC MODELING 
 
We used the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique, which is used to capture the 
efficiency due to a correlation of disturbances across equations. The correlation between 
equations maybe due to firm-specific attributes that affect the capital and labor in the regression 
equations used above. The regression coefficients are to be estimated efficiently, however 
classical least squares applied equation by equation may not yield efficient coefficient 
estimators. Hence, SUR is a procedure in which the regression coefficients in all equations are 
estimated simultaneously. Aitken’s generalized least squares is applied to the whole system of 
equations and yields coefficient estimators at least asymptotically more efficient than single-
equation least squares estimators. The results in table 6 summarize the effect of corporate taxes 
on both capital and labor using the SUR technique, wherein the sum of the corporate tax 
coefficients of both capital and labor are restricted to one, as suggested by our analytical 
framework. The labor and capital regressions aren’t separate regressions and therefore are 
components of a single regression. The coefficients explain the relative burden borne by capital 
and labor due to the imposition of a corporate tax. Three proxies (namely GFA, ROE, and ROD) 
have been used for capital, along with wages as a proxy for the labor impact. The regression 
results are as reported below. 
 
5.1 SUR for GFA and Wages 
In the first regression, the estimated tax coefficient is 0.9988, which explains that 99 percent of 
the burden of corporate taxes falls on capital. The positive significant coefficient implies that 
higher tax rates lead to lower asset formation by firms. The tax coefficient in the labor equation 
is 0.0012, which implies that 0.12 percent of the burden falls on labor (table 6).  
 
The second set of equations now adds TFP to the regressions. We use TFP obtained from both 
fixed effects and the Levinsohn–Petrin 2003 estimation methods. Controlling for TFP, the 
burden on capital reduces only marginally and is around 99 percent. The labor burden increases 
marginally from 0.0012 to 0.0071 in case of fixed effects TFP.  
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In the third set of regressions we control for power and fuel charges and raw material costs 
individually and then together. The results show that the relative burden on labor is now 0.86 
percent when controlled for both power and raw material charges. The tax coefficient on capital 
is 0.9914, which means 99 percent of the burden of a corporate tax is on capital only (table 6), 
hence, the burden of a corporate tax is largely on capital in Indian firms. 
 
 
Table 6: SUR Results for GFA and Wages 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant ((1-s)/s)* 
LN(1-Tax 
Rate) 
LN(1-Tax 
Rate) 
LN(Power 
& Fuel) 
LN(Raw 
Material) 
LN(TFPfe) LN(TFPlevpet) Obs. 
LN(GFA)  5.3509 
(0.0108) 
 0.9988* 
(0.0001) 
    62139 
LN(wage) 2.9075 
(0.0106) 
0.0012 * 
(0.0001) 
     62139 
LN(GFA) 0.3137 
(0.0179) 
 0.9929* 
(0.0002) 
  0.9085* 
(0.0026) 
 38103 
LN(wage) -3.0952 
(0.014) 
0.0071*  
(0.0002) 
   1.0331* 
(0.002) 
 38103 
LN(GFA) 6.000  
(0.0098) 
 0.9968*  
(0.0002) 
   -0.0006*  
(0.000) 
50225 
LN(wage)  3.5225 
(0.01) 
0.0032*  
(0.0002) 
    -0.0003*   
(0.000) 
50225 
LN(GFA) 4.2773 
(0.0075) 
 0.9974*   
(0.0001) 
0.6993* 
(0.0021) 
   50226 
LN(wage)   1.8622 
(0.0084) 
0.0026*  
(0.0002) 
 0.6742* 
(0.0023) 
   50226 
LN(GFA)   3.1438   
(0.017) 
 0.9932* 
(0.0002) 
 0.5789* 
(0.0028) 
  39631 
LN(wage) 0.2045  
(0.017) 
0.0068*   
(0.0002) 
  0.6439*  
(0.0028) 
  39631 
LN(GFA) 3.6163 
(0.0139) 
 0.9914*    
(0.0002) 
0.5508*  
(0.0035) 
0.1896*   
(0.0033) 
  38103 
LN(wage) 0.6249 
(0.0158) 
0.0086*   
(0.0002) 
 0.446*    
(0.004) 
0.3247*   
(0.0038) 
  38103 
Note: In all the tables * means significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and ***  
significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
5.2 SUR for ROE and Wages 
Treating ROE as the proxy for capital, the first set of regressions show that 99.75 percent of the 
burden falls on capital, and labor bears 0.25 percent of the burden of a corporate tax. In the next 
set of regressions the tax coefficient on capital falls to 99.33 percent and the burden on labor 
increases to 0.67 percent. Controlling for power and raw material charges, we find that 99 
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percent of the burden still falls on capital while labor bears only 1 percent burden of the 
corporate taxes (table 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: SUR Results for ROE and Wages 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant ((1-
s)/s)*LN(1-
Tax Rate) 
LN 
(1-Tax 
Rate) 
LN 
(power & 
fuel) 
LN 
(raw 
material) 
LN 
(TFPfe) 
LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
Obs. 
LN(ROE) -2.3137 
(0.0072) 
 0.9975* 
(0.0001) 
    46865   
LN(wage) 3.2029 
(0.0122) 
0.0025* 
(0.0001) 
     46865   
LN(ROE) -3.091 
(0.0306) 
 0.9933* 
(0.0001)   
  0.1546*   
(0.0042) 
 29350 
LN(wage) -3.3590 
(0.0159) 
0.0067*   
(0.0001) 
    1.0616* 
(0.0022) 
 29350 
LN(ROE) -2.1255 
(0.0076) 
 0.9949* 
(0.0003) 
   -0.0001*   
(0.000)  
38242   
LN(wage)   3.7827  
(0.0117) 
0.0051*    
(0.0003)  
    -0.00003  
(0.0117) 
38242   
LN(ROE) -2.4819 
(0.0102) 
 0.9971*   
(0.0002)  
0.1311*   
(0.0027) 
   38242   
LN(wage) 2.00 
(0.0102) 
0.0029*   
(0.0002) 
 0.6637*   
(0.0027)   
   38242   
LN(ROE) -2.588   
(0.0204) 
 0.9876*    
(0.0003) 
 0.0939* 
(0.0032)   
  30385    
LN(wage) 0.2584 
(0.021) 
0.0124*   
(0.0003)     
  0.6502*   
(0.0033)  
  30385    
LN(ROE) -2.5096  
(0.0213) 
 0.99* 
(0.0003) 
.0410* 
(0.005) 
0.0616*   
(0.0048) 
  29350 
LN(wage) 0.6652   
(0.0193) 
   0.01*   
(0.0003) 
 0.4457* 
(0.0045) 
0.3292*   
(0.0044)   
  29350 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
5.3 SUR Results for ROD and Wages 
The results for ROD reported below are for the time period 2011–15 only due to unavailability 
of data. The same results, as above, are obtained with ROD as the dependent variable. In the 
first set of regressions, 99.57 percent of the burden is borne by capital while only 0.43 percent 
of the burden is borne by labor. Controlling for power and raw material charges, the coefficient 
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of corporate tax for labor increases to 0.97 percent, while the capital burden remains at 99 
percent (table 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: SUR Results for ROD and Wages 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant ((1-s)/s)* 
LN(1-tax 
rate) 
LN(1-tax 
rate) 
LN(power 
& fuel) 
LN(raw 
material) 
LN(TFPfe) LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
Obs. 
LN(interest rate 
paid on debt) 
-2.2017   
(0.0156) 
 0.9957*  
(0.0003) 
    13570 
LN(wage) 4.2299 
(0.02) 
0.0043*   
(0.0003) 
     13570 
LN(interest rate 
paid on debt) 
-4.825  
(0.113) 
   
0.9998*   
(0.0001) 
  1.364*  
(0.0575) 
 12348 
LN(wage) -10.0847 
(0.0399) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
   7.4690*   
(0.0202) 
 12348 
LN(interest rate 
paid on debt) 
-1.9675 
(0.0241) 
 1.0018*   
(0.0003) 
   -0.101*   
(0.009) 
12347 
LN(wage) 5.9392  
(0.023) 
-0.0018*   
(0.0003) 
    -0.7549*  
(0.009) 
12347 
LN(interest rate 
paid on debt) 
-2.4867  
(0.025) 
   
0.9975*  
(0.0002) 
0.0969*  
(0.0059) 
     12348 
LN(wage) 2.4552 
(0.019) 
0.0025* 
(0.0002) 
 0.6178*   
(0.0045)   
     12348 
LN(Interest rate 
paid on debt) 
-2.9198* 
(0.0493) 
 0.9893*  
(0.0004) 
 0.121*   
(0.0071) 
  9852 
LN(wage) 0.8222  
(.0396493) 
0.0107* 
(0.0004) 
  0.6034*   
(0.0057) 
  9852 
LN(interest rate 
paid on debt) 
-2.8982   
(0.0519) 
 0.9903*  
(0.0004) 
0.0310*   
(0.0106)   
0.0992*  
(.0105202) 
  9593   
LN(wage)    1.151 
(0.035) 
0.0097*  
(0.0004) 
 0.4341*   
(0.0072) 
0.2927* 
(0.0072) 
  9593   
Source: Author’s computations 
 
 
5.4 Dynamic Estimates  
To estimate the effect of corporate taxes on capital and labor, we use the one-step generalized 
method of moments (GMM) by Arellano and Bond (1991) for the estimation of dynamic panel 
datasets, as we have large cross-sectional and small time-series units. The two regression 
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equations are now treated as separate equations and give the efficiency effects of corporate 
taxation. The dynamic relationship is characterized by the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors. 
  
Suppose we consider the equation: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where i=1…N and t=1….T. Also suppose 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡, where 𝜇𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) and  
𝜗𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜗
2) are independent of each other. 
 
The inclusion of the lagged independent variable renders the OLS estimates biased and 
inconsistent, even if the 𝜗𝑖𝑡 are not serially correlated. This is due to the correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and the error term. In case of the fixed effects estimator, the within 
transformation wipes out 𝜇𝑖𝑡 but 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is still correlated with 𝜗?̅? by construction. Hence the 
fixed effects estimator will be biased and consistent only when → ∞ . Therefore, when N is 
large and T fixed, the within estimator is biased and inconsistent. The random effects estimator 
will also be biased in a dynamic panel data model.  
 
A first difference transformation of the model was suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). 
This first differencing was used to get rid of 𝜇𝑖 and then the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation procedure would be used; however, the above method leads to consistent but 
inefficient estimates of the parameters. Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a GMM procedure 
that is more efficient than the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator. The methodology used by 
Arellano and Bond (explained below) argued that additional instruments can be obtained if the 
orthogonality conditions between the lagged values of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and the disturbances 𝜗𝑖𝑡 are used. 
Their methodology can be illustrated with the help of a simple autoregressive model with no 
regressors: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
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Where i=1…N, t=1….T, and uit = μit + ϑit, with μit~IID(0, σu
2) and  ϑit~IID(0, σϑ
2) 
independent of each other and among themselves. 
 
In order to get consistent estimates, the individual effects are first eliminated by first 
differencing the equation to obtain:  
 
yit − yi,t−1 = δ(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + (ϑit − ϑi,t−1) 
 
When t=3, we have:  
 
yi3 − yi2 = δ(yi2 − yi1) + (ϑi3 − ϑi2) 
 
In this case, yi1 is a valid instrument, since it is highly correlated with (yi2 − yi1) and not 
correlated with (ϑi3 − ϑi2) as long as ϑit are not serially correlated. 
  
For t=4, 
 
yi4 − yi3 = δ(yi3 − yi2) + (ϑi4 − ϑi3) 
 
In this case, yi2 as well as yi1 are valid instruments for (yi3 − yi2), since both yi2 and yi1 are not 
correlated with (ϑi4 − ϑi3). Adding valid instruments in this fashion for period T, the set of 
valid instruments becomes (yi1, yi2…… . yi,T−2 ). 
 
Let w be the matrix of all instruments of individual i, so pre-multiplying the difference equation 
in the vector form with the matrix of all instruments gives: 
 
W′∆y =  W′(∆y−1)δ +  W′∆ϑ 
 
Now, if we perform generalized least squares on this model, we will get the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) one-step consistent GMM estimator. 
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The Arellano–Bond estimation is done for both capital and labor as dependent variables. The 
two regressions are now treated as two different equations and hence give the efficiency effects 
of the corporate tax. The coefficients now explain the effects of an increase in the corporate tax 
on capital and labor.  
 
In the first set of regressions, the coefficient of one minus corporate tax is insignificant and 
hence it is inferred that in this bivariate model, GFA are not affected by corporate taxes. 
However, the coefficient turns significant as we control for wages, power and fuel charges, raw 
material charges, and TFP. The coefficients for corporate tax are positive and significant, as 
expected. In the last set of regressions, an increase in the corporate tax by 1 percent will lead to 
a fall in the GFA by 0.0534 percent (table 9). 
 
Table 9: Dynamic Estimates for Capital, with GFA as Proxy for Capital 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant Lagged 
GFA 
LN(1-tax 
Rate) 
LN 
(wage) 
LN 
(power & 
fuel) 
LN(raw 
material) 
LN(TFPfe) LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
Obs. 
LN(GFA) 0.6956   
(0.0423) 
0.876*   
(0.0084) 
0.0118 
(0.0142) 
     54076 
LN(GFA) 1.0941   
(0.0418) 
0.7334*   
(0.0101) 
0.0285**    
(0.0127)   
0.1269* 
(0.0056)   
    50580 
LN(GFA) 1.059  
(0.0336)   
0.8042*   
(0.0068) 
  0.04*   
(0.0121) 
 0.0718*   
(0.0046) 
   40626 
LN(GFA) 0.97   
(0.0317) 
0.815*  
(0.0059) 
0.0556*   
(0.0127) 
  0.0489*   
(0.0032) 
  31968 
LN(GFA) 1.028   
(0.0331) 
  0.7918*   
(0.0066) 
0.0513*   
(0.0121)  
 0.0568*    
(0.0054) 
0.0343*   
(0.0037) 
  30699 
LN(GFA) 0.2503     
(0.0439) 
0.8021*     
(0.006) 
  0.0522*   
(0.0120)   
   0.5836*   
(0.0285) 
 30665 
LN(GFA) 1.2925   
(0.0354) 
0.8242*   
(0.0056) 
0.0301**   
(0.0121)  
    -0.0924*   
(0.0043) 
40358 
LN(GFA) 1.1201    
(0.0393)   
0.7591*   
(0.0095)   
  0.0534*   
(0.0117)   
0.0421*   
(0.0082) 
0.0484*   
(0.0054)    
  0.0301*   
(0.0038) 
  30665 
Note: In all the tables * means significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and *** 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
In the first regression of the dynamic panel, with the log of one minus corporate tax as the 
independent variable, as the corporate tax rate increases by 1 percent, the ROE falls by 0.784 
percent (table 10). The coefficient is positive and highly significant in the bivariate model itself. 
As we control for other variables, the coefficient of corporate taxes falls. In the next regression, 
with power, raw material, and wages as the independent variables, an increase in the corporate 
tax rate by 1 percent leads to a fall in the ROE by 0.62 percent. The coefficient is highly 
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significant: considering other explanatory variables, an increase in wages by 1 percent leads to a 
fall in equity returns by 0.2192 percent. Though the coefficient for power is negative, it is 
insignificant. The raw material charges are seen to have a positive impact on equity returns. This 
may occur because as investment in raw materials increases, output and profitability also 
increase. Increasing profits lead to increasing returns to equity holders. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Dynamic Estimates for Capital, with ROE as Capital Proxy 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant Lagged 
ROE 
LN(1-tax 
rate) 
LN 
(wage) 
LN(power 
& fuel) 
LN(raw 
material) 
LN(TFPfe) LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
Obs. 
LN(ROE) -1.669    
(0.0325)   
0.2925*   
(0.0128) 
0.784*   
(0.0346)   
     31589 
LN(ROE) -1.717   
(0.0542) 
0.3007*   
(0.0129) 
0.7961*   
(0.0346)   
0.0286*  
(0.0113) 
 
    30251 
LN(ROE) -1.495   
(0.0486) 
0.3073*   
(0.0133) 
0.7357*   
(0.0373) 
 -0.0056   
(0.0119)  
 
   25242 
LN(ROE) -2.016   
(0.0759) 
0.2667* 
(0.0143)    
0.6602*   
(0.0416)   
  0.0789*   
(0.0106) 
  20113 
LN(ROE) -1.895   
(0.0816)   
  0.2655*   
(0.0146)  
0.6545    
(0.0424)   
 -0.116*    
(0.0176)   
0.1258*   
(0.0142) 
  19483 
LN(ROE) -3.652  
(0.1972) 
0.2409*   
(0.0143) 
0.6764*  
(0.0418) 
   1.0706*    
(0.0978)   
 19471 
LN(ROE) -1.0018   
(0.0832)    
0.3127*    
(0.0133) 
0.7291*   
(0.0374) 
    -0.1280*    
(0.0188)    
25143 
LN(ROE) -1.683  
(0.0864) 
0.2696*   
(0.0146) 
0.6207*   
(0.0427) 
-0.2192*   
(0.0235) 
-0.0043    
(0.0209) 
 
0.1787*   
(0.0152) 
  19471 
Note: In all the tables * means significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and *** 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
 
In the ROD and corporate taxes scenario, the analysis for the relationship between the interest 
rate paid to debt holders by the firm and the corporate taxes is limited to the period 2011–15 due 
to the unavailability of data for the remaining years. In the bivariate model (with the log of one 
minus corporate tax as the independent variable) the coefficient of the corporate tax rate is 
negative but insignificant. Controlling for other factors, the coefficient of corporate taxes turns 
positive but continues to remain insignificant (table 11). Hence we conclude that the corporate 
taxes do not affect the interest rate paid on the debt incurred by the firm. Wages and power and 
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fuel charges may lead to a higher return to debt holders due to higher profitability by the 
employment of these factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Dynamic Estimation for Capital, ROD as Capital Proxy 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant Lagged 
ROD 
LN(1-tax 
rate) 
Ln 
(wage) 
LN(power & 
fuel) 
LN(raw 
material) 
LN 
(TFPfe) 
LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
Obs. 
LN(interest 
rate paid on 
debt) 
-1.711  
(0.0816) 
0.2702*   
(0.0336) 
-0.0718   
(0.0491) 
     7047 
LN(interest 
rate paid on 
debt) 
-2.836  
(0.1592) 
0.2387*   
(0.0338) 
-0.064   
(0.0482) 
0.2424*   
(0.0279) 
    7000 
LN(interest 
rate paid on 
debt) 
-2.3271  
(0.1176) 
0.2736*   
(0.0353) 
-0.0557   
(0.0503)  
 0.188*   
(0.0233) 
   6484 
LN(interest 
rate paid on 
debt) 
-2.114   
(0.1607) 
0.3416* 
(0.0426)   
0.016   
(0.0577) 
  0.0947*  
(0.0193) 
  5250 
LN(interest 
rate paid on 
debt) 
-2.437 
(0.1743) 
0.3386* 
(0.0427) 
0.0103 
(0.0584) 
0.1541* 
(0.0323) 
0.0486** 
(0.0236) 
   5123 
LN(interest 
rate paid on 
debt) 
-6.1491  
(0.529) 
0.3318*  
(0.0426) 
0.0156   
(0.0581) 
   2.2985 * 
(0.2542) 
 5121 
LN(interest 
rate paid on 
debt) 
-1.504  
(0.0898) 
0.2849*  
(0.0363) 
-0.0604    
(0.0508) 
    -0.0814*    
(0.0238)   
6469 
LN(interest 
rate paid on 
debt) 
-3.1747   
(0.2391) 
0.2942*  
(0.0435) 
0.0129   
(0.0572) 
 
0.2075* 
(0.0488) 
  0.1005*   
(0.0346) 
0.0266   
(0.024) 
 
    5121 
Note: In all the tables * means significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and ***  
significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
In the wages and corporate taxes scenario (table 12), we present the results of the impact of 
corporate taxes on wages. In the bivariate model, the coefficient of one minus corporate taxes to 
wages is positive and significant. A 1 percent decrease in one minus corporate taxes (effectively 
an increase in the corporate tax rate) will lead to a 0.0004 percent decrease in wages. We control 
for all the capital proxies individually. In the seventh regression in table 12 (when we control for 
ROE, power and fuel charges, and raw material charges), the coefficient of one minus corporate 
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tax increases to 0.0017. Hence, a 1 percent decrease in one minus corporate taxes (effectively an 
increase in the corporate tax rate) will lead to a 0.0017 percent decrease in wages. Similarly, 
controlling for GFA, power and fuel charges, and raw material charges, the coefficient of one 
minus corporate tax becomes 0.0015.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12a: Panel Estimation Using GFA 
Dependent 
Variable/ 
Independent 
Variable 
Constant Lagged 
Wage 
((1-s)/s)* 
LN(1-Tax 
Rate) 
LN 
(GFA) 
LN 
(ROE) 
LN(Power 
& Fuel) 
LN(Raw 
Material) 
LN 
(TFPfe) 
LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
Obs. 
LN(Wage) 0.4278   
(0.0254) 
0.8823*   
(0.0089) 
0.0004*   
(0.0001) 
      51032 
LN(Wage)   -0.0792   
(0.0243) 
0.6952*  
(0.0106)   
0.0005* 
(0.0001) 
0.2020* 
(0.0063) 
     49577 
LN(Wage) 0.2703   
(0.0348) 
1.0123*   
(0.0115) 
0.000 
*(0.0001) 
 0.07* 
(0.0034) 
    34300 
LN(Wage) 0.4635  
(0.0183) 
0.6872* 
(0.0065) 
0.0007* 
(0.0001) 
  0.2938*  
(0.0045) 
   40352 
LN(Wage) -0.1803   
(0.0223) 
0.7857* 
(0.0061) 
0.0015* 
(0.0001) 
   0.1941*   
(0.0035) 
  31774 
LN(Wage) -0.0609   
(0.0202) 
0.6821*  
(0.006) 
0.0016* 
(0.0001) 
  0.2265*  
(0.0051) 
0.1142* 
(0.0037) 
  30612 
LN(Wage) -0.0141  
(0.0270) 
0.7566*   
(0.0094) 
0.0017* 
(0.0001) 
 0.0305* 
(0.0026)  
0.1869* 
(0.0063) 
0.0926* 
(0.0046) 
  21897 
LN(Wage) -0.2237  
(0.028) 
0.6376*   
(0.0085)   
0.0015* 
(0.0001) 
0.0573* 
(0.0075) 
 0.2186* 
(0.0051) 
0.1130* 
(0.0036) 
  30585 
 
Table 12b: Panel Estimation Using ROE 
 
 
Constant Lagged 
wage 
((1-s)/s)* 
LN(1-tax 
rate) 
LN(TFPfe) 
when ROE 
is capital 
proxy 
LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
when ROE 
is capital 
proxy 
LN(TFPfe) 
when GFA 
is capital 
proxy 
LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
when GFA 
is capital 
proxy 
Obs. 
LN(wage) -4.331    
(0.0541) 
0.6723* 
(0.0070) 
0.0016* 
(0.0001) 
3.011*   
(0.0348)   
   
21897 
LN(wage)   1.030  
(0.0379) 
0.9692*   
(0.0081) 
0.0005*   
(0.0001) 
 -0.2027*   
(0.0078) 
  
28418 
LN(wage) -3.917   
(0.0422)  
0.6877* 
(0.0051) 
0.0015*   
(0.0001) 
  2.7858*   
(0.0261)  
 
30585 
LN(wage) 0.776   
(0.0258)    
  0.8622*   
(0.0063) 
0.0006*   
(0.0001) 
    -0.0996*   
(0.005) 
40259 
Note: In all the tables * means significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and *** means 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Author’s computations 
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The results in table 12 are controlled only for ROE and GFA. We run separate regressions 
controlling for ROD, as this is only a four-year period regression. Table 13 presents the results 
for the same regression. Controlling for ROD, the coefficient of one minus corporate taxes to 
wages is 0.0005. The effects of corporate taxes remain the same in all the other regressions as 
well.  
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Dynamic Estimation for Labor Variable (Four-year Analysis) 
 
 
Constant Lagged 
wage 
((1-s)/s)* 
LN(1-tax 
rate) 
LN(ROD) LN(power 
& fuel) 
LN(raw 
material) 
LN(TFPfe) 
when ROD 
is capital 
proxy 
LN 
(TFPlevpet) 
when ROD 
is capital 
proxy 
Obs. 
LN 
(wage) 
1.4213 
(0.2293) 
0.5949* 
(0.0696) 
0.0005* 
(0.0001) 
     11355 
LN 
(wage) 
1.8688 
(0.1897) 
0.5975*   
(0.0448) 
0.0005* 
(0.0001) 
0.0419* 
(0.006) 
    7340 
LN 
(wage) 
1.2414 
(0.1359) 
0.5189* 
(0.0355) 
0.0012* 
(0.0002) 
 0.2905* 
(0.0087) 
   8786 
LN 
(wage) 
0.2012 
(0.1477) 
0.7352* 
(0.0337) 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
  0.1713* 
(0.0068) 
  6623 
LN 
(wage) 
0.309 
(0.1258) 
0.6610* 
(0.0295) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
 0.1966* 
(0.0107) 
0.0924* 
(0.0073) 
  6375 
LN 
(wage) 
0.4591 
(0.1296) 
0.621* 
(0.0283) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0053 
(0.0052) 
0.1945* 
(0.0109) 
0.0986* 
(0.0076) 
  5291 
LN 
(wage) 
-7.8598 
(0.0853) 
0.3573* 
(0.0186) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0001) 
   5.5257* 
(0.0505) 
 6752 
LN 
(wage) 
2.626 
(0.1537) 
0.5049* 
(0.0334) 
0.0005* 
(0.0002) 
    -0.1755* 
(0.0088) 
6750 
Note: In all the tables * means significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and *** means 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
Source: Author’s computations 
 
 
Analyzing the dynamic panel results of the impact of corporate taxes on capital and labor, we 
infer several things. The impact of corporate taxes falls more on capital than labor in the case of 
GFA and ROE; however, when the interest paid on debt is taken as a proxy for capital, the 
coefficients of corporate taxes are insignificant in the capital equation, while in the labor 
equation the impact of corporate taxes is significant. Hence, the burden of corporate taxes falls 
more on labor than capital, as proposed by Harberger (1962). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Using the improvised analytical framework of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007), this paper 
estimated the corporate income tax incidence in a general equilibrium framework. Further, using 
SUR and dynamic panel estimates, we tried to empirically capture the relative impact of 
corporate tax on capital and labor. Using data for 5,666 Indian firms for the period from 2000–
15, the econometric coefficients of SUR and dynamic panel estimates suggest that capital bears 
most of the burden of a corporate tax while the effect on labor is almost negligible. The results, 
however, vary with different proxies for capital. The result is contrary to the Harberger (1962) 
hypothesis that the incidence of corporate taxes is shifted to labor. However, earlier studies on 
corporate tax incidence in the context of India also suggest that the incidence is on capital, and 
not shifted to labor.  
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